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Aid Suspensions as Coercive Tools? 
The European Union’s Experience in the African-
Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) Context 
   
Clara Portela 1 
 
  
Abstract 
 
Since the signing of the Cotonou Agreement in 2000, the European Union (EU) has 
suspended development aid towards a number of African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
countries in response to breaches of Human Rights and democratic principles by 
activating the so-called Human Rights clause (article 96). The present article analyses 
the use by the EU of aid suspensions as political tools and their efficacy in achieving 
the desired policy goals, in an attempt to identify and explain the determinants leading 
to the success of these measures. The investigation finds that the use of development 
aid suspensions is frequently effective. Classical sanctions theory appears to account 
largely for their success, given that most targets display a significant degree of 
dependence on the EU as a donor or a trading partner. However, and without refuting 
the explanatory power of that approach, a closer look at this practice unveils a number 
of factors that contribute to facilitate success. One of them is the selective use of the 
tool: suspensions are applied predominantly in cases of interruptions of the 
democratic process, while they are rarely used in situations of violent conflict. The 
specificities of the consultations mechanism, and especially the attitude of ACP 
neighbouring countries- often openly supportive-, largely determine the final outcome. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Over the past decade, the European Union (EU) has suspended development co-
operation with a number of African-Caribbean–Pacific (ACP) countries. These 
suspensions have taken place within a specific legal-institutional regime: the 
Partnership Agreement between the EU and ACP countries, the Cotonou Convention 
of 2000, which succeeded a series of Lomé Conventions embodying a privileged 
relationship between the EU and the former colonies of some of its Member States. 
Article 96 of the Cotonou Convention provides for a consultation procedure which 
can be invoked in cases of serious breaches of Human Rights and democratic 
principles, and which empowers the Council of the EU to suspend development aid. 
The use of this tool has provoked some controversy: the EU has sometimes been 
accused of inconsistency in invoking article 96, and in particular in suspending aid. 
However, little is known about the efficacy of these measures: are development aid 
cut-offs effective in compelling ACP leaders to comply with EU demands? EU 
officials have pointed to the limited knowledge the EU has about the use of sanctions 
(Niño-Pérez 2004). The Commissioner for External Relations and Neighbourhood 
Policy recognises that the use of sanctions “needs to be optimised” (Ferrero-Waldner 
2006). This paper sets itself the objective of assessing the efficacy of development aid 
cut-offs in the framework of the Cotonou Agreement as a coercive instrument of EU 
foreign policy. It does so by reviewing the cases in which it has been wielded since 
the entry into force of the Convention. The standard of success used here is that set by 
the EU itself: An episode is deemed “successful” here when the EU considered 
progress sufficiently satisfactory to resume aid. Departing from general sanctions 
theory, the paper attempts to isolate and evaluate the factors accounting for their 
success and failure before drawing some conclusions for EU policy in this domain.    
 
 
2. Sanctions and their Evaluation: The Need for a Fresh Approach 
 
Since the end of the Cold War, the instrument of sanctions has been subject to a 
profound transformation. The classical general trade embargo has been replaced by 
so-called targeted or “smart” sanctions. They are designed to affect directly the 
leadership responsible for the objectionable behaviour, avoiding the adverse 
humanitarian consequences of comprehensive economic sanctions which provoked 
their unpopularity. The concept of targeted sanctions encompasses a diverse range of 
measures: travel bans, financial sanctions such as the freezing of assets or investment 
bans, arms embargoes, flight bans and embargoes on specific commodities (Hufbauer 
and Oegg 2000). The EU was at the forefront of the promotion of targeted sanctions at 
UN level. It has officially embraced this notion (Council 2004), and it has consistently 
applied only smart sanctions in its autonomous sanctions practice in the context of its 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) since the early nineties.  
 
However, in parallel to its CFSP sanctions, the EU continues to impose some 
measures whose characteristics approximate those of economic sanctions. The 
suspensions of development aid as part of the “appropriate measures” foreseen in 
Article 96 of the Cotonou Convention are measures of economic nature taken on 
political grounds and with a coercive intention. Yet, the EU does not label these 
measures “sanctions”, and keeps this practice legally separate from CFSP measures. 
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The EU designs its suspensions in such a way as to spare the population of the 
country concerned from suffering deprivation: they only affect budget support 
provided directly to governments. Nevertheless, the suspension of aid under article 96 
remains an influence attempt in which a benefit (development aid) is withdrawn that 
would otherwise be available, and whose provision is made dependent on the 
fulfilment of a series of conditions defined by the sender (the EU) and the target on 
the basis of a mutual agreement.  
 
The objective of the present paper is to ascertain their coercive power, i.e. whether 
they managed to compel the desired behavioural change in the targeted leadership, 
and what conditions facilitate efficacy. Efficacy is defined here as the capacity of the 
measures to produce the intended results. The standard of success is adopted from the 
EU itself: it is the imposing organisation that measures compliance internally and 
decides what degree of compliance suffices to resume aid.    
 
At first sight, an exploration of the efficacy of development aid cut-offs might appear 
to bear little connection to the current sanctions debate. However, the findings can 
reveal precisely how effective economic instruments remain in the era of targeted 
sanctions. Determining the efficacy of aid cut-offs will enable us to ascertain how 
economic pressure fares in the overall sanctions toolbox. Are targeted sanctions 
delivering better results in terms of target compliance than the traditional economic 
tool?   
 
The present paper looks into cases of EU suspension of aid to ACP countries from 
2000 to the present. The signing of the Cotonou Agreement in 2000 marks the starting 
year of the series of cases examined. Political conditionality and development aid cut-
offs predated the signing of the Cotonou Agreement. The suspension clause was first 
introduced with article 336a into the Lomé IV Convention as a provision to enhance 
the protection of Human Rights and democracy. Previous to that date, development 
aid to ACP countries had been suspended on several occasions; however, the 
unavailability of legal bases at the time makes the process leading to the decisions on 
these instances hard to trace (Hazelzet 2005: 4).    
    
3. Development Aid Suspension: What Kind of (EU) Sanction?  
 
Which place do development cut-offs occupy in the EU sanctions tool-box? From an 
EU institutional point of view, the suspension of development co-operation is not 
properly a “sanction”. In EU terminology, the term sanction is reserved for those 
measures decided under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which 
typically encompass arms embargoes, visa bans and the freezing of financial assets. In 
the present paper, I draw on the following definition of the notion: “Sanctions” can be 
defined as the interruption of normal relations or the withdrawal of a benefit by a state 
(or group of states) in response to an objectionable action by another state or entity. 
The “sender” is the entity imposing the sanction and the “target” is the entity at the 
receiving end. The aim of the sanction is to compel the target to put an end to the 
undesirable behaviour. They are meant to withhold a benefit from the target until it 
complies with a demand by the sender that it would not otherwise have agreed to. 
Therefore, the suspension of development aid fits into the academic definition of 
sanctions, even though in EU parlance it is not referred to as such. 
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The procedure leading to the suspension of development aid is highly institutionalised. 
The respect for Human Rights, democratic principles and the rule of law constitute 
essential elements of the ACP Partnership Agreement. It foresees a consultation 
procedure under its Article 96 in order to address violations of these principles by any 
of its parties. Once a serious breach has been observed, the Council of the EU invites 
the ACP country concerned to participate in consultations under Article 96. The 
decision is taken by the Council on a Commission’s proposal. Consultations have to 
start no later than 15 days after the invitation is issued, and shall last for no longer 
than 60 days (120 days after the 2005 review of the agreement). The objective of the 
consultations is to agree on measures to rectify the situation in the country in question. 
The EU and the ACP country shall adopt a list of commitments with a timetable to be 
fulfilled by the responsible government. When consultations are closed, the EU 
evaluates the progress made by the government in fulfilling the commitments entered 
into and might then decide on “appropriate measures”. These might entail, among 
others, the suspension of development cooperation. Appropriate measures can also 
consist of positive measures, such as the release of new funds. Suspension can be total, 
for which unanimity in the Council is required, or partial, for which a qualified 
majority suffices. Subsequently, the EU conducts regular monitoring, including the 
dispatch of missions to the country to assess progress in implementation.  
 
Not even in cases where the suspension is total is the entire flow of aid interrupted. 
The suspension only affects one strand of development aid, namely the budget support 
administered directly by the state, mostly affecting infrastructure projects. Moreover, 
the suspension is only meant for projects that are not yet in place, leaving ongoing 
programmes unaffected. The suspension often takes the form of the non-notification 
of the upcoming European Development Fund (EDF) programme. Humanitarian aid is 
expressly exempted, and development aid directly in support of the population and 
channelled through NGOs is often left in place. This might include health and 
education programmes, food security, programmes in support of civil society, human 
rights and democracy, and rural development projects. Regional projects involving 
several countries are not interrupted as a result of the suspension of development aid 
against one of the participants. Finally, bilateral co-operation programmes remain 
unaffected by EU development aid suspensions, which only concern Community 
funds. Member States are free to continue bilateral aid despite EU suspension, and 
some of them often do.   
 
A tactic often used by the EU in order to signalise discontent with the policies of one 
of the beneficiaries of its development aid is the redirection of aid towards aims 
different to that it had been originally allocated to. The EU has taken this approach 
also in the context of article 96 suspensions – this has been the case e.g. with 
Zimbabwe, where funds foreseen for budget support have been redirected towards 
humanitarian aid and projects in direct support of the population. 
              
4. Article 96 Aid Suspensions: Actual Usage 
 
An overview of the cases of article 96 consultations reveals that it is mostly imposed 
in cases of coups d’état (Bradley 2005). Most cases of suspension were officially 
justified as reactions to both Human Rights violations and to the interruption of 
democratic processes. However, there is a clear predominance of the democracy 
element: article 96 was invoked whenever the democratic process was interrupted – 
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such as in cases of flawed elections – even if no Human Rights breaches took place. 
By contrast, no cases can be found where Human Rights violations constituted the 
only motive for holding consultations. The predominance of interruptions of the 
democratic process might be ascribed to an implicit assumption that Human Rights 
are better protected under democratic regimes. Also, the proposal to hold 
consultations is likely to prosper following a clear-cut violation such as a coup d’état 
or an illegal constitutional reform, while in the case of Human Rights, the nature and 
extent of the breaches are often more difficult to document. This type of violations 
might allow some members of the Council to withhold their consent to the call for 
consultations, and the government at fault might contest the occurrence of the 
breaches be more easily.    
 
The fact that the suspension of development co-operation to ACP countries takes 
place in the specific institutional framework of the “appropriate measures” that follow 
consultations invoked under article 96 bears important consequences. Firstly, 
consultations provide a framework in which the country in question has an 
opportunity to present its plan to remedy the breach by entering into specific 
commitments and drafting a timetable jointly with the EU. The suspension of 
development cooperation is a measure of last resort: Only in cases where the 
consultations fail to produce satisfactory results does the EU consider it.     
 
Finally, the fact that the government in question maintains effective control over most 
of the territory of the country seems to be a pre-condition for the opening of 
consultations. Hazelzet notes that the EU refrains from invoking article 96 in 
situations of violent conflict, such as “during a civil war, or when a country was on 
the verge of a peace agreement” (Hazelzet 2005:12). In addition to the volatile 
character of conflict situations, the involvement of the UN or other organisations in 
many of the countries in conflict makes article 96 consultations redundant (García-
Pérez 2007:4). In most cases, the EU has become involved in these countries by 
participating in broader political processes, such as in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo. In these situations, the EU has typically wielded CFSP tools like arms 
embargoes and the interruption of military co-operation, such as Sudan in 1996 and 
Ethiopia/Eritrea in 1999. In sum, the EU invokes article 96 whenever it considers that 
it stands a reasonable chance of influencing the leadership responsible for the 
breaches.  
       
5. Sanctions Operation: What Does Theory Say? 
 
The operation of sanctions was originally formulated by Galtung in what he labelled 
the “naïve” theory of sanctions. According to the naïve theory, the economic 
disruption caused by sanctions is expected to translate into political pressure that will 
eventually compel the leadership to change its policies, or lead to its overthrow 
(Galtung 1967). Sanctions are therefore expected to work in a similar way to military 
coercion. Their aim is the “political disintegration of the enemy so that he gives up the 
pursuit of his goals. The method used is value-deprivation” (Galtung 1967:386). The 
theory foresees a roughly proportionate relation between value-deprivation and 
political disintegration: “The idea is that there is a limit to how much value 
deprivation the system can stand, and that once this limit is reached (resulting in a 
split in leadership or between leadership and people), then political disintegration will 
proceed very rapidly and lead to surrender or willingness to negotiate” (Galtung 
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1967:388). It presupposes that a “societal transmission belt” produces political 
pressure eventually leading to the ousting of the leaders, thereby turning economic 
damage into political pressure.  
 
Subsequent scholarship has devised a broader formulation capable of accommodating 
the operation of non-economic sanctions, which are absent in the naïve theory’s 
account. Pressure exerted by sanctions compels decision makers “to change their 
calculation of costs and benefits” (Lindsay 1985:155; Cortright and Lopez 2000:22). 
The aim is to exert a sufficiently strong pressure on the offending state so that 
continuing to suffer the measures applied against it represents a higher cost than 
putting an end to its wrongful behaviour. In sum, two different ways of operation of 
sanctions can be discerned in sanctions theory: One foresees that the targeted 
leadership will comply with the demands of the sender as a result of a calculation in 
which the disutility caused to it outweighs the benefits of persisting in the 
objectionable policies. This disutility can either take the form of personal damage 
inflicted on policy-makers (as a consequence of blacklisting for a visa ban or the 
freezing of financial assets), or that of political pressure transmitted through the 
“societal conveyor belt” as a result of other measures.  
 
Sanctions such as trade embargos can be geared at any of these two possible outcomes: 
the leadership is expected to be compelled to yield by the prospect of destabilisation, 
or else be overthrown. In many cases, it cannot be discerned whether the sender has 
only one of these outcomes in mind when levying the sanctions. Due to the decline in 
use of multilateral comprehensive trade embargos, the scenario of “success by 
overthrow” has become less frequent. Targeted measures generally cause less abrupt 
disruption to the target society, so that they are more likely to achieve “success by 
compliance”.  
 
The case of development aid suspension under Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement 
fits better with the mechanism of success by compliance than with the overthrow-
scenario. EU aid sanctions operate differently from the classical trade embargo. The 
EU does not intend to extort the population – on the contrary, it makes a dedicated 
effort to spare it from deprivation. Humanitarian aid is maintained, and often even 
increased, notably through the redirection of the funds withheld to projects in support 
of the population. The disutility that the EU expects to inflict on the target arises from 
a series of interlinked considerations: the absence of new infrastructure projects 
creates a negative business environment in the country, thereby failing to attract 
foreign investment. Moreover, given that donors co-ordinate their policies, the EU’s 
withdrawal is often accompanied by that of the international financial institutions and 
other EU Member States. In the absence of donor support and private foreign 
investment, economic performance worsens. As a result, the government  becomes 
increasingly unpopular domestic circles. While a population which is not suffering 
extreme deprivation is unlikely to conduct a revolt of the type foreseen by the naïve 
theory, the multiplying effects of aid suspension provides the concerned government 
with an incentive to avert it.     
     
6. How are Sanctions Evaluated? A Brief Outline 
 
The landmark work evaluating sanctions efficacy, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered 
(Hufbauer et al. 1985; HSE in the following) inspired subsequent scholarship, while it 
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also faced criticism on various accounts (Hovi et al. 2005). In order to ascertain the 
determinants for the success of EU development aid suspensions, the present article 
has adapted HSE’s variables. 
        
HSE analyse two types of variables: economic and political. Most of the economic 
variables are designed to ascertain the economic cost imposed on the target country 
and on the sender. In the case of ACP countries, the importance of the EU to the target 
country in political and economic terms is closely interlinked. Thus, HSE’s distinction 
between the headings “Political” and “Economic Variables” becomes blurred. The 
scope of the suspension of aid, or type of sanction (i) and the importance of the EU as 
a trading partner (ii) and as a donor (iii) will be taken into account, as they indicate 
not only the level of disutility created to the target, but also its vulnerability. HSE’s 
political variables encompass a factor which is now obsolete: the presence of 
international assistance as an effort to undermine the sanctions regime – a 
phenomenon that belongs to the Cold War confrontation. The motive triggering the 
suspension (iv) and the numbers of years the sanctions were in force (v) are also 
included. The neighbours’ attitude (vi), which has been highlighted as a factor of 
central importance in the literature, is also considered.  
 
The methodology outlined by HSE contemplates two separate investigations: it first 
ascertains the “policy result” and then the “sanctions contribution” to the desired 
objective. The present investigation simplifies the analysis by creating a single table, 
in an attempt to identify which conditions are conducive to a successful conclusion of 
consultations. The selection of cases follows three criteria: the table features partial or 
total suspensions of aid resulting from consultations under article 96 of the Cotonou 
Agreement in which no mandatory sanctions were imposed simultaneously by the 
UNSC. The case of Liberia is therefore excluded.  
 
The following list features cases of consultations in which a suspension of aid was 
decided, leaving out all those instances in which progress was so smooth that the EU 
did not deem it necessary to use coercion in the first place. This is e.g. the case of 
consultations with Guinea-Bissau or the recent consultations with Mauritania.
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7. Cases of Article 96 Aid Suspensions  
 
 Measure years EU as 
partner 
EU as 
donor 
reason Neighbour’s 
attitude 
Resumption 
of aid 
Central 
African 
Republic 
Partial 
suspension 
2003-2005 
(2) 
Very 
high 
Very 
high 
Coup d’état none + 
Ivory 
Coast 
Partial 
suspension 
2000-2002 
(2) 
Very 
high 
High Flawed 
elections  
None + 
Fiji Partial 
suspension 
2001-2003 
(2) 
high Low Coup d’état None + 
Haiti (Almost) 
total 
suspension 
2001 (1) low high Flawed 
elections 
OAS/ 
Consultative 
Group 
+ 
Guinea-
Conakry 
Partial 
suspension 
2003-
ongoing (4) 
high high Coup d’état none +/- (partial 
resumption) 
Togo (Almost) 
total 
suspension  
(1993-94); 
1998 -2006 
(13) 
- - Illegal 
constitutional 
change  
ACP 
supportive 
+ 
Zimbabwe Partial 
suspension 
2002 – 
ongoing (5) 
medium high Flawed 
elections 
Neighbours 
opposed 
- 
 
 
7.1 Central African Republic  
 
The Central African Republic has not been favoured by the donor community in spite 
of its heavy dependence on foreign aid. The EU has a prominent role among donors, 
especially since the IMF cut budgetary support in 2001 (Laakso et al. 2006). Article 
96 was invoked following a coup d’état by General Bozizé in 2003, which overthrew 
President Patassé. Consultations, starting in June 2003, were not limited to the 
discussion of democracy and Human Rights, but addressed also economic governance 
and corruption, and even respect for the Kimberly process concerning the export of 
diamonds.  
 
A monitoring mission in October 2003 concluded that, while dialogue on 
reconciliation had been successful, progress made regarding the freedom of the 
opposition, the timetable for elections and the reform of the military was 
unsatisfactory. Therefore, the Council decided a partial suspension of development 
co-operation encompassing some road projects, macro-economic support, and a 
progressive reduction of the 9th EDF funds by 20% per year. Cooperation was 
resumed following the flawless presidential and legislative elections in 2005.     
 
7.2 Ivory Coast 
 
A comparison of the case of Ivory Coast with that of the Central African Republic 
shows that different former colonies often receive different treatment by the former 
metropolis. Ivory Coast has strong trade ties with France, partly maintained by a 
significant French business community. Following the flawed elections in 2000, from 
which Guei emerged as a successful candidate over his opponent Gbagbo, the EU 
called for consultations pointing to unfulfilled commitments that had been agreed in 
previous rounds of consultations under article 366a of the Lomé Convention. 
However, Guei was soon thrown away from office by a popular uprising and replaced 
by Gbagbo. Following the closure of consultations in July 2001, the EU decided to 
resume aid through a gradual and conditional approach, with an emphasis on funding 
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projects in support of the restoration of democracy, rule of law and good governance. 
Co-operation was fully resumed in January 2002 in view of satisfactory progress by 
the Ivorian government. However, the outbreak of violence compelled the EU not to 
sign the indicative programme agreed under the 9th EDF, so that most of the 
substantial funds it had originally committed were never disbursed. Only a few 
projects on rural development and good governance were financed. Nevertheless, the 
Commission expanded the scope of the humanitarian aid to encompass elections 
preparations and DDR programmes.      
 
Consultations were again proposed by the Commission in 2004 in view of the Human 
Rights breaches that followed the intensification of fighting in the north of the country 
that started in 2002. However, the Council rejected the proposal arguing that the threat 
of civil war would render Article 96 consultations ineffective. This decision was 
justified on the grounds that “the problem lay not in the nature of the reconciliation 
government per se but in the fact that this…not exist in any tangible sense as an 
interlocutor for the Union” (Youngs 2006:346). What followed was a period in which 
French bilateral activity gained pre-eminence, while EU assistance remained de facto 
suspended and other Member States gradually winded down their bilateral 
programmes.   
 
7.3 Fiji 
 
Fiji is one of the ACP countries which is less dependent on European aid; indeed, it is 
barely eligible for aid. Consultations under article 96 were initiated in October 2000, 
following a coup d’état in May of that year. During the consultations, power shifted 
from the original putschistes to the military, and eventually to a nominated President.  
 
The EU made the notification of 9th EDF allocation and the financing of new 
programmes under the previous EDF (6th to 8th) conditional upon the holding of 
elections and the appointment of a legitimate government. Yet, regional projects, 
humanitarian aid and trade related preferences were left in place. Once the conditions 
were fulfilled, the EU decided on a gradual resumption of cooperation in November 
2001, consisting of projects in support of the rural population and on Human Rights 
and democracy. However, an irregularity observed in the allocation of seats in the 
parliament - a number of elected MPs of the Labour Party had been excluded - left the 
EU unsatisfied. Full co-operation was only resumed in November 2003 after the 
nomination of Labour cabinet ministers. 
 
A new round of consultations was held in early 2007 following the military take-over 
that took place in Fiji in December 2007. The leadership undertook a number of 
commitments, including the holding of elections no later than the March 2009.   
 
7.4 Haiti 
 
As the poorest country in the Western hemisphere, Haiti is heavily dependent on 
foreign aid. However, the importance of the EU as a trading partner is low due to the 
overwhelming commercial weight of the US. Article 96 was invoked as a 
consequence of the electoral fraud observed in the May 2000 legislative elections. As 
a result of the consultations held in September 2000, the Haitian government 
promised to arrange new elections for senators.  
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Following the Haitian failure to abide by its commitment, the EU decided the 
suspension of budget aid and food security and of the second instalment of the 8th 
EDF, redirection of the remaining funds to projects in direct support of the population, 
civil society and private sector and the non-notification of the 9th EDF. Only 
humanitarian aid was left in place. In the following years, the EU modified its 
measures several times as a result of its participation in the Consultative Group of 
Haiti, whose members encouraged the EU to lift the suspension. Development aid was 
resumed in October 2005 as a result of the Haitian commitment to hold elections, 
which eventually took place in February 2006.  
 
7.5 Guinea-Conakry 
 
The democratic standards in the Republic of Guinea had been deteriorating for some 
time before the flawed presidential elections of December 2003 gave rise to 
consultations with the EU. These opened in July 2004 and concentrated on 
improvements to be made in the electoral process, such as freedom of the media and 
non-harassment of the opposition. In April 2005, the EU decided to redirect the 
unexpended balances of previous EDF towards decentralisation, liberalisation of the 
media and economic governance, while 9th EDF funds continued for programmes in 
direct support of the population. Slight progress by the Guinean authorities, for 
example with respect to the operation of independent radio senders has been 
reciprocated with a partial lifting of measures. However, as the current administration 
and the opposition have not yet agreed a programme for electoral reform, cooperation 
has not resumed fully.  
 
7.6 Togo 
 
The EU suspended part of its aid to Togo already in 1993 as a consequence of an 
illegal change to the Constitution made by President Eyadema. Cooperation was 
resumed after the Constitution was restored in 1994, but it was interrupted again in 
1998 due to flawed presidential elections. The EU supported financially the 
establishment of an independent national electoral commission for the 2003 election; 
however, Eyadema dissolved it and the elections were again reported to be flawed. 
Togo did not receive any EU funds of the 8th and 9th EDF – it was only a recipient of 
humanitarian aid. Following consultations in 2004, co-operation is now in place again.  
 
The case of Togo is unusual in that the consultations that took place in 2004 were 
called at the request of its government. Consultations started in March 2004 and were 
closed in November, with an agreement by the Togolese authorities to implement a 
list of commitments, mainly related to the re-establishment of democratic rule. The 
resumption of full co-operation was made conditional on the holding of free elections. 
A number of problems surfaced at the implementation phase, so that the monitoring 
mission in June reported that despite the good will shown by the government, it was 
not possible to make a conclusive evaluation. However, the EU decided to release 
funds to support the preparation of elections, human rights programmes and justice 
reforms. Following the signing of the Global Political Agreement by government and 
the opposition and the announcement of elections in the following year, the EU fully 
resumed aid in 2006.     
 
7.7 Zimbabwe 
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The case of Zimbabwe is exceptional in a number of respects: It is the only example 
in which a suspension of aid under article 96 has been complemented by CFSP 
sanctions. Previous cases of development aid suspension combined with visa bans or 
arms embargoes (Nigeria 1993 or Sudan 1990) were handled outside the EU-ACP 
framework, given the unavailability of the consultations procedure before 1995. 
Zimbabwe has also been described as a deviant case in studies of governance, human 
rights and democracy in ACP countries. It has been singled out as the only case in 
which, according to the relevant indicators, freedom of participation had improved in 
the year previous to consultations under article 96 (Laakso et al. 2006).  
 
Consultations were called following the refusal by the Zimbabwean authorities to 
allow the entry into the country of EU electoral observers on the eve of the 2002 
elections, and their harassment of the opposition. A central déclencheur of the crisis 
was President Mugabe’s policy of illegal occupation of large farms and eviction of 
their white owners. The EU moved very quickly from the political dialogue under 
article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement to article 96 consultations, and these were 
apparently exceptionally short (interview: 2007). The suspension of co-operation that 
ensued left not only humanitarian aid in place, but also health and food security 
programmes. Equally, programmes under the European Initiative for Democracy and 
Human Rights (EIDHR) continued – over the past few years, more than seventeen 
projects have been conducted. Immediately after the suspension, the EU imposed 
CFSP sanctions: an arms embargo along with a visa ban and a freezing of assets 
against one of the longest blacklists of the EU. This order was strictly respected: the 
EU only proceeded to impose CFSP sanctions once the consultations had been closed. 
At the time of writing, no progress has been made. Zimbabwe’s neighbours continue 
to offer their political support to Mugabe. On the contrary, the deep economic crisis 
has compelled the EU to increase the amount of humanitarian aid provided.  
 
The presence of CFSP sanctions does not seem to have made any noticeable impact 
on the situation (interviews 2007). If anything, the imposition of CFSP measures 
might have a negative effect on the behaviour of the leadership: Zimbabwe is the only 
case of consultations under article 96 Cotonou where no progress has been observed 
over a period of five years.  
 
8. When Do Development Aid Suspensions ‘Work’?  
  
Five out of the seven cases display an unequivocally positive result. The large number 
of successes hardly comes as a surprise, given that consultations are called only in 
situations where the EU believes to stand a reasonable chance of influencing the 
leadership in breach. Article 96 is not invoked in every case of violation of Human 
Rights and democratic principles. This selective approach partly accounts for the high 
level of success. Nevertheless, the positive record stands in sharp contrast with the 
overall performance of CFSP sanctions, which features few successes. Yet, the 
positive record of Article 96 has to be qualified by a number of considerations.  
  
To start with, the eventually positive outcomes are often preceded by tortuous paths to 
resumption. The uncooperative Haitian authorities, as opposed to the forthcoming 
Central African Republic, are a case in point. Only in Guinea-Conakry, where results 
are still considered suboptimal despite some progresses, and Zimbabwe aid has not 
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totally resumed. A number of failed consultations undertaken under Lomé IV reveal 
that the co-operation of countries at breach cannot be taken for granted: Ivory Coast 
and Togo had undergone consultations under Lomé with poor results. Thirdly, the 
degree of progress towards the EU demands to be achieved by the target in order to 
allow for a resumption of aid is decided by the EU itself, rather than by any 
independent evaluator. In certain cases such as Guinea-Conakry, it is doubtful that 
any external assessment would have considered that the meagre progress made by the 
leadership warranted the re-establishment of co-operation.  
 
Thirdly, success has to be assessed against limited - albeit not modest - goals: the EU 
has largely achieved its goal of promoting a return to democratic rule. However, the 
fact that conditions were met to an extent that the EU considered sufficient to fully 
resume co-operation could not prevent a recurrence of violence and grave human 
rights breaches in Ivory Coast. Indeed, none of the countries featured in the list have 
overcome the structural fragility of its institutions. Countries like Ivory Coast, 
Guinea-Bissau and Fiji present a pattern of recurrence of democratic crisis. 
Consultations are highly useful instruments, but they do not go beyond solving the 
crises at hand. Moreover, EU officials resent the fact that leaderships that proved very 
co-operative during the consultations were far more reluctant to implement reforms 
after these were terminated (interview 2007). Lastly, the fact that the development aid 
suspensions under CFSP proved unsuccessful in compelling a behavioural change in 
the leaderships at fault – such as Nigeria in 1993, Sudan in 1994, or Zimbabwe in 
2002 – suggests that it is the intensive exchange between the parties that takes place 
during the procedure of consultations what provides for positive outcomes. In 
conclusion, the consultations constitute a highly useful tool for the reestablishment of 
democratic rule in emergency situations, but remain ill-suited to provide for lasting 
solutions to deep-rooted instability in weak states.  
 
The most often voiced criticism against the EU decisions to suspend development aid 
is its alleged lack of consistency. However, what becomes apparent in terms of the 
motives that compel the EU to invoke article 96 is the predominance of interruptions 
of the democratic process. Human Rights breaches are also omnipresent (although not 
explicitly displayed as such by the table). However, these are invariably linked to 
democratic flaws: a deterioration of the Human Rights situation alone has never 
triggered article 96 consultations. Also, the Human Rights breaches that the EU reacts 
to through this mechanism are civil and political rights closely linked to the 
democratic process: freedom of speech, freedom of association and of peaceful 
demonstration. Some of them are defined in terms of facilitating the holding of free 
and fair elections, such as the freedom of the press and the non-harassment of the 
opposition. Interestingly, in the context of Article 96 consultations ACP leaderships 
are often encouraged to subscribe to commitments related to good governance such as 
anti-corruption measures, although they are formally protected by a different 
provision of the Cotonou Agreement, article 97. This article has only been invoked 
once, in the case of Liberia, where consultations took place in parallel to article 96 
consultations.  
 
In terms of efficacy, the most significant finding is that suspension works best as a 
coercive tool in cases where the EU is either an important trading partner or an 
important donor (or both), and crucially, whenever neighbouring countries are 
supportive of the EU. This is an intuitive finding, and it is possible to ascertain how 
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these factors are interrelated: neighbouring countries which do not are agree with EU 
suspension might be in a position to supply the country not only with political support, 
but also with essential supplies, which will reduce the importance of the EU as a 
donor and trading partner. From this point of view, the analysis tends to confirm the 
continued relevance of the determinant factors identified by traditional sanctions 
research: the EU has considerable economic weight as a donor or a trade partner in 
almost all the cases, and the co-operation of neighbours or like-minded countries 
proved highly relevant. In any case, the central determinant for the success of EU 
development aid cut-offs remains the attitude of the concerned leadership. In a 
number of cases, the coups d’état were conducted to unseat a leader whose own 
democratic record was poor with the unequivocal intention of restoring civilian 
democratic rule, therefore providing a favourable terrain for consultations. In these 
cases, the EU found itself in the role of “accompanying” some putschistes who were 
from the start ready to co-operate in a democratic transition. This is the case of the 
Central African Republic, and also of Mauritania and Guinea-Bissau, whose 
forthcoming attitude prevented the EU from cutting-off aid.  
 
Still, the fact that Guinea-Conakry presents the characteristics that would make it 
amenable to EU leverage has not prevented it from being still a relative failure. For its 
part, Zimbabwe appears to be a veritable deviant case. It is wealthier than most of the 
other examples, at least measured by pre-crisis indicators. Apart from the fact that the 
moves to consultations and subsequently to suspension seem to have taken place in a 
rush, the almost simultaneous imposition of CFSP sanctions signalise a more 
confrontational stance than in other cases. It should not be forgotten that the motive 
for suspension, the irregularities in the 2002 elections, generally garners less support 
from ACP neighbours than military coups. Support from its neighbours is central in 
Zimbabwe’s resistance, both from an economic and symbolic point of view. The 
situation appears highly atypical also from a sender-target point of view. The unsound 
economic policies of the Mugabe government have triggered a humanitarian crisis 
that compelled the EU to increase the amount of aid (interview 2007).   
 
Finally, the low proportion of non-African cases in the sample might obscure the role 
played by the geographic location of the target. Placed in the Caribbean, Haiti belongs 
to the sphere of influence of the US, which contrasts with the European pre-eminence 
in most of Sub-Saharan Africa. While the result of the consultations was eventually 
positive, the Haitian leadership proved less forthcoming than many of the other cases. 
The heavy involvement of the OAS in the resolution of the Haitian democratic crisis 
seems to have strongly influenced the behaviour of the EU – the decision to resume 
aid as been described a being motivated by the desire to appear as a “credible partner” 
in the Consultative Group on Haiti (Laakso 2006:37). In this case, the involvement of 
other interlocutors seems to have reduced the EU’s room of manoeuvre.       
 
9. Conclusions  
 
The use by the EU of development aid suspensions as a political tool to address 
breaches of democratic rule in ACP countries is reasonably effective. The success of 
this instrument can be largely ascribed to the weight that the EU carries for the 
concerned countries as a donor and a trading partner, but also to the positive attitude 
of neighbours and fellow members of the ACP group. The institutionalised and 
transparent nature of the consultation process is another factor contributing to article 
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96’s satisfactory performance. However, this success should be qualified by the 
selective use of this tool by the EU, which has generally refrained from calling 
consultations in cases of violent conflict, or in cases where it simply does not expect 
to dispose of sufficient leverage.    
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